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1Monetary Policy under Uncertain
Planning Horizon
1 Introduction
The traditional view on optimal monetary policy was guided by the intu-
ition that monetary instrument variables have to be chosen to solve a dy-
namic optimization problem. The insightful paper by Kydland and Prescott
(1977) on time inconsistency initiated a reversion of this view. A policy
appears to be time inconsistent if it sets time paths for the control vari-
ables at time zero that are no longer optimal at a later time t. Barro and
Gordon (1983a,b) transferred these considerations to monetary policy and
underlined that monetary policy is not a game against nature but against
rational economic agents. They argue that monetary authorities face a time
inconsistency problem when they try to minimize a social loss function that
includes both: an ambitious ouput target (i.e. an ouput target that exceeds
natural output) and price stability. While the monetary authority is assumed
to determine inﬂation by appropriate use of monetary instruments, private
agents (respectively trade unions) have to build inﬂationary expectations to
decide on nominal-wage-claims optimally. Given that ouput is determined by
a Lucas-supply-curve and private agents have rational expectations the situ-
ation ends up in an inﬂationary bias, i.e. an excessive inﬂation rate without
real eﬀects.
The following expositions aim at analyzing the crucial role of the time
horizon in the above described monetary policy game. While the cases of a
ﬁnite and an inﬁnite horizon are well examined, there has been no analysis
of the case of an uncertain horizon of the interaction process - possibly due
to the fact, that this case has not been seen as relevant, yet. It is shown that
the case of an uncertain horizon can be analyzed analogously to the inﬁnitely
repeated case. Besides that we show the basic results of the Barro-Gordon-
model to hold true under the more realistic assumption of a quadratic loss
function of the monetary authority.
22 Model, First- and Second-Best-Solution
The following expositions draw on a nonstochastic economy that is described
by the fundamental relation:
Yt = wPt ¡ w
e
Pt (1)
where Yt denotes (the log of) current output, wPt inﬂation and we
Pt the trade
unions’ inﬂationary expectations. This equation refers to the well-known
Lucas-supply-function pointing out that expectation-errors with regard to
inﬂation are causing real eﬀects, i.e. generate deviations of the current out-
put (employment) from the natural rate of output (employment). For con-
venience we deﬁne the natural rate of output to be zero.
There are two actors in the standard monetary policy game. On the
one hand we have the monetary authority that is assumed to be able to
manipulate the inﬂation rate directly.1 On the other hand we deal with
trade unions that form inﬂationary expectations to be able to decide on the
labor supply optimally.
The monetary authority is supposed to be interested in realizing a social
optimal inﬂation rate w¤
P and an ambitious output target Y ¤ > 0. Diﬀerent
from Barro and Gordon (1983b) we assume the monetary authority’s loss
function to be quadratic in both, the inﬂation and the output objective.2










¢ ¯ ¢ (Yt ¡ Y
¤)
2 with Y
¤ > 0; (2)
where ¯ denotes the relative importance of the output objective. It is as-
sumed that the monetary authority’s objectives conﬁrm with society’s prefer-











1This unrealistic assumption can be relaxed without substantial eﬀect on the argument.
2This is due to the fact, that the loss function used by Kydland/Prescott (1977) and
Barro/Gordon (1983b) is in general inconsistent with the welfare criterion of pareto op-
timality usually employed in models with optimizing agents. Compare Sargent/Wallace
(1976, S.181) for a more detailed discussion of this aspect.
3where r is a discounting factor.
Trade unions try to prevent to be fooled by the monetary authority. When
forming their expectations they make use of all relevant and available infor-
mation, i.e. they have rational expectations.
The sequential structure of the game is as follows. At the beginning
of every single period the monetary authority announces a certain rate of
inﬂation wa
Pt. Afterwards trade unions form their inﬂationary expectations
and anticipate them during the wage negotiations. Finally the monetary
authority determines the rate of inﬂation in order to minimize its expected
intertemporal loss.
The ﬁrst best solution wPt = w¤
P, Yt = Y ¤ of the above described game
can be calculated by minimizing the one period loss from expression 2 with
respect to wPt and Yt. Because the realization of the ﬁrst best solution
would require a systematic expectation error by the trade unions and the
trade unions are assumed to form rational expectations it is clear that ﬁrst
best can not be reached. The second best solution, i.e. the best solution that












¢ ¯ ¢ Y
¤2
: (5)
3 Nash-equlibria of ﬁnite-horizon-games
We will now turn to the Nash equilibria of ﬁnite horizon games. In the
one-shot game monetary authority announces the second best inﬂation rate
from expression 4. After the trade unions have formed their expectations and
wage negotiations took place, the optimization problem has changed since the
monetary authority can now treat inﬂationary expectations as given. Thus
ex post the monetary authority has a strong incentive to perform surprise
inﬂation in order to push current output above the natural level. Since the
trade unions form rational expectations they are aware of that incentive. The



















¢ ¯ ¢ Y
¤2
: (7)
The same solution applies to each ﬁnitely repeated game. This is due to the
fact that the solution of the one-shot game can be transferred from the last
period to all preceding periods by backward induction.
4 Nash-equilibria of inﬁnite-horizon-games
Since there is no last period in inﬁnite horizon games, such games can not be
solved by backward induction. Thus, building up a reputation in favour of an
anti-inﬂationary policy is possible. As Barro and Gordon (1983b) have shown
we have to compare the gains and losses from violating the announced rate
of inﬂation to be able to judge whether a certain announced rate of inﬂation
is credible.
The temptation of violation TOVt can be calculated as diﬀerence between
the one period loss under sticking to the announcement lst








When sticking to the announcement, i.e. wPt = we
Pt = wa
Pt, the monetary














¢ ¯ ¢ Y
¤2
(9)
whereas cheating, i.e. wch
Pt = w¤
P + ¯ ¢ Y ¤ and we
Pt = wa




















The cost of violating an announced rate of inﬂation COVt depends on the
trade unions’ reactions on a successful deception by the monetary authority.







P ; if wa
Pt¡1 = wPt¡1
w¤
P + ¯ ¢ Y ¤ ; else
; (11)
5i.e. trade unions penalize cheating in period t by uncooperative behaviour in
the following period t+1. In period t+2 we face the same problem as in period
t because reputation is restored at that time. The cost of violation can be
calculated as discounted diﬀerence between the loss under the discretionary
solution wPt = we
Pt = w¤










In ﬁgure 1 we graph the temptation and the cost of violation versus the
announced rate of inﬂation. The resulting curves are similar to the case
of an asymmetric objective function since TOV is a convex and COV a
concave function of the announced inﬂation rate.3 Since cheating appears to
be reasonable for the monetary authority if
TOVt > COVt; (13)
the TOV - and the COV -curve determine a range of credible inﬂation rate
announcements with the lower bound w
a;min
P and the upper bound w
a;max
P .
For convenience we deﬁne w¤
P = 0. In this case the interceptions of the




¯ ¢ (1 ¡ ¯) ¢ Y ¤ ¡
¯¢Y ¤
1+r






¯ ¢ (1 ¡ ¯) ¢ Y ¤ +
¯¢Y ¤
1+r
1 ¡ ¯ + 1
1+r
: (15)




¯ ¢ (1 ¡ ¯) ¢ Y ¤ §
¯¢Y ¤
1+r
1 ¡ ¯ + 1
1+r
= ¯ ¢ Y
¤: (16)
Altogether we can conclude that the results of Barro and Gordon’s analy-
sis (1983b) hold true in the case of a symmetric objective function of the
monetary authority, too.
3Compare Barro/Gordon (1983b), ﬁgure 1, p. 112.
4Compare equation 6.
65 Nash-equilibria of games with uncertain
horizons
We will now consider the case of an uncertain horizon of the monetary pol-
icy game. We will show that the assertion, a monetary policy game with
stochastically determined end would end up in the same solution as the in-
ﬁnitely repeated game,5 is not true. Therefore we assume the game to end
with probability h in the end of each period t and this information to be
common knowledge.
The case of an uncertain planning horizon can be analyzed analogously
to the above case of an inﬁnite horizon game. The temptation to violate an
announced inﬂation rate does not alter compared to the inﬁnitely repeated
case. However, the cost of violation decreases owing to the fact that the loss
of reputation does not embody a potential threat to the monetary authority









as the cost of violation in games with uncertain horizon. For the lowest




¯ ¢ (1 ¡ ¯) ¢ Y ¤ ¡ (1 ¡ h) ¢
¯¢Y ¤
1+r






¯ ¢ (1 ¡ ¯) ¢ Y ¤ + (1 ¡ h) ¢
¯¢Y ¤
1+r
1 ¡ ¯ + (1 ¡ h) ¢ 1
1+r
: (19)
To be able to compare the two situations under inﬁnite and uncertain plan-
ning horizon, both cases are shown in ﬁgure 1. The introduction of uncer-
tainty about the planning horizon aﬀects the COV -curve only. The higher
the probability of game-interruption, the less steep the slope of the COV-
curve gets.6 Thus the lower bound of the range of credible announcements
seems to grow with increasing probability of game interruption. Analytically
5Compare f. ex. G¨ artner (1997), p. 432.










(1 ¡ h2) ¢ COV










. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 1: Credible versus incredible announcements under certain and un-
certain planning horizon
this can be shown by calculating the lower bound of credible announcements
from equation 18 for given discount rates r and rising probability of game-
interruption h. It is easy to see that w
a;min
P is increasing in h. For h = 1,
i.e. the game will end after period t with certainty, we get the discretionary
solution w
a;min
P = ¯ ¢ Y ¤.
To summarize, we can state that the lowest credible inﬂation rate an-
nouncement under uncertain planning horizon is positively related to the
probability of game interruption.
6 Conclusions
There are two things we can learn from the above expositions.
8Firstly we have shown that the basic results of the Barro-Gordon-model
hold true under the realistic assumption of a quadratic loss function for the
monetary authority. This has often been claimed7 but never been shown for
the inﬁnitely repeated case.
Secondly it was demonstrated that the planning horizon of economic
agents in monetary policy games is a crucial factor for the resulting inﬂa-
tionary bias. The case of an uncertain planning horizon of the game can
be analyzed analogously to inﬁnite horizon games but is not identical to the
inﬁnitely repeated case.
There are several situations the case of an uncertain planning horizon
can be applied to. A historical example is the Maastricht Treaty that cre-
ated a situation of uncertainty for the EU member states by ﬁxing criteria
for the beginning of European Monetary Union and thus making the further
responsibility for monetary policy of most European national central banks
somewhat uncertain. If the EU member states would have agreed on an un-
conditional starting date for monetary union, the inﬂation rates in the EU
member countries during the transitional phase possibly would have been
signiﬁcantly higher. The same problem could arise in the countries applying
for a future membership in EMU. With increasing probability to be admitted
for monetary union at a certain future date the central bank’s ability to make
use of its reputation will erode. Thus these countries should choose adequate
strategies to be able to resist the incentive to produce inﬂationary surprises
during the last periods of their responsibility for monetary policy. According
to Rogoﬀ’s (1985) proposal a successful strategy might be to grant the cen-
tral bank a high degree of independence and to install a weight-conservative
central banker.
7See f. ex. Barro and Gordon (1983b), p. 105, footnote 2.
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